The Civic Scribe: Articles & Poems

As The Gambia approaches its 2026 presidential election, the country finds itself at a critical juncture in its post-authoritarian political trajectory. Nearly a decade after the peaceful removal of long-time ruler Yahya Jammeh, the election is less about the novelty of democratic change and more about whether democratic norms have become sufficiently institutionalized to endure political competition, incumbency pressures, and public disillusionment.

The transition that began in 2016 was widely celebrated as a rare example of democratic reversal in a region marked by executive dominance and constitutional manipulation. Yet transitions do not automatically produce consolidated democracies. They initiate a longer and more uncertain process in which rules, institutions, and political behavior must align over time. The 2026 election tests whether The Gambia has moved beyond a personality-driven transition toward a system governed by predictable rules and accountable leadership.

At the center of current debates is the question of incumbency. President Adama Barrow’s decision to seek another term has intensified concerns about the gradual normalization of extended executive tenure. While his candidacy is legally permissible, legality alone does not resolve broader democratic concerns. In transitional democracies, repeated incumbency bids often blur the line between competitive politics and state dominance, particularly where institutional checks remain weak, and public resources can be leveraged for political advantage.

Equally significant is the state of the opposition. The fragmentation and internal contestation within major opposition parties highlight a recurring problem in post-transition politics: the inability of opposition forces to transform popular dissatisfaction into cohesive, programmatic alternatives. Where opposition politics remains centered on personalities rather than policy platforms, elections risk becoming exercises in elite competition rather than vehicles for substantive democratic choice.

Public trust in institutions represents another fault line. Confidence in the electoral process, the neutrality of oversight bodies, and the fairness of campaign conditions is essential for democratic legitimacy. Even the perception of institutional bias can undermine electoral outcomes, regardless of procedural correctness. In this context, rhetorical questioning of the integrity of electoral institutions should not be dismissed merely as partisan maneuvering; it reflects deeper anxieties about whether democratic safeguards are sufficiently insulated from political pressure.

The Gambian case also illustrates a broader challenge faced by many emerging democracies: the tension between symbolic democratic practices and substantive governance outcomes. Elections alone do not guarantee democratic consolidation if they are not accompanied by improvements in economic opportunity, service delivery, and responsiveness to citizen concerns. Persistent youth unemployment, rising living costs, and perceptions of elite detachment risk hollowing out democratic participation, particularly among younger voters for whom the post-2016 optimism has faded.

Nevertheless, The Gambia retains important democratic assets. Its electoral traditions, active civil society, independent media, and history of peaceful political engagement provide a foundation that many countries lack. The challenge in 2026 is to ensure these assets function not as symbolic markers of democracy, but as effective constraints on power and channels for accountability.

Ultimately, the significance of the 2026 presidential election lies not only in who wins but in how the contest is conducted and perceived. A credible, competitive, and peaceful election would signal that The Gambia’s democratic transition is maturing into consolidation. A contested or polarizing process, by contrast, would suggest that the gains of the past decade remain vulnerable.

For scholars of democratization, The Gambia offers a timely reminder that transitions are not endpoints. They are provisional openings, sustained only when political actors internalize democratic norms and citizens continue to believe that participation yields meaningful influence. The 2026 election will reveal whether that belief still holds.