The Civic Scribe: Articles & Poems

The Gambia stands at a precipice. Last month, in a WhatsApp audio message played to supporters in his home village, former dictator Yahya Jammeh proclaimed he would return this November after nearly nine years in exile. “Nobody can prevent me from coming in,” he declared, invoking a purported agreement that initially facilitated his departure.

In response, the government of President Adama Barrow has bolstered security at the international airport with military units and intelligence operatives. Officials reaffirm Jammeh’s right to return while underscoring that it does not shield anyone from responsibility for alleged crimes. Yet this public display of preparedness belies deeper vulnerabilities. Despite the visible reinforcements at official entry points, Jammeh could exploit the nation’s porous borders, fragmented security apparatus, and enduring political support to stage a return that deliberately bypasses government oversight.

The fundamental question isn’t whether Jammeh will attempt to return, but how he might successfully enter a country that remains deeply torn between bringing him to justice and welcoming him home.

Jammeh’s potential return triggers traumatic memories for a nation still reconciling with his 22-year rule, marked by well-documented atrocities and corruption. His initial departure in 2017 came only after regional forces intervened to uphold his electoral loss. Now, the Barrow administration faces a complex dilemma, complicated by its own unlikely political alliance with Jammeh’s former party members. This very coalition that brought Barrow to power now complicates any straightforward action against the man he replaced.

The most straightforward scenario involves Jammeh exploiting The Gambia’s notoriously porous borders, avoiding official entry points entirely. Instead of arriving at the airport, he could enter through one of the many informal crossings along the Gambia River or its extensive coastline. This approach would leverage his enduring support in border regions, where loyalists could coordinate his arrival by land from Senegal or by sea. His recorded message specifically addressing supporters in his hometown suggests an operational awareness of these geographic advantages.

A more alarming possibility involves Jammeh exploiting his residual support within Gambia’s security establishment. Despite years of reform efforts, the security services remain potentially divided between professional loyalty to the current government and enduring allegiances to the former leader. Jammeh could calculate that elements within the military or police would facilitate his entry, either through deliberate non-intervention or active assistance. This could mean sympathetic personnel turning a blind eye at a remote border crossing or providing a security escort to ensure his safe passage. Such a move would mirror his historical reliance on paramilitary groups whose networks may still be operational.

A third, more political scenario involves behind-the-scenes negotiations resulting in a managed return that saves face for both parties. Jammeh has referenced an old memorandum of understanding supposedly guaranteeing his right to return. This approach would likely involve regional mediators and result in Jammeh returning under specific conditions—possibly including restrictions on his political activities. However, this would outrage victims’ organizations, which have warned that any return without accountability would reopen deep wounds and argue that peace cannot be built on impunity.

The international community also has a significant stake in how this unfolds. Regional forces remain stationed in The Gambia, a reminder of the considerable investment in the country’s democratic transition. These bodies are unlikely to welcome any outcome that undermines the nation’s truth and reconciliation process or risks destabilizing the country again.

As November progresses, The Gambia faces its most significant challenge since Jammeh’s initial departure. The nation’s fragile democracy hangs in the balance between the rule of law and political pragmatism. Jammeh’s return would test the very institutions and reforms implemented since his departure.

The porosity of The Gambia’s borders, the potential divisions within its security services, and the enduring political support for Jammeh create a perfect storm of vulnerability. No amount of airport security can address these deeper structural weaknesses. When Jammeh proclaimed, “Nobody can prevent me from coming in,” he understood these realities better than anyone. The coming days will reveal whether The Gambia’s institutions are strong enough to prove him wrong.